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Puri’s Sexual States contributes to the growing body of work about conceptions 
of state power. It offers us a way of understanding sexuality’s constitutive effects 
upon the state. She argues that, as the state seeks to define normal sexuality, to 
discipline bodies and to regulate sexual relations, the state itself becomes sexualized. 
Mundane institutions and routine practices of the state are “thoroughly imbued with 
considerations of sexuality.” (p. 6). 
The book enters the sexual state through s. 377 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. 
While the provision is used to criminalize the non-vaginal sexual assault of women, 
sexual assault of men, and the sexual abuse of children, it has been elevated, the book 
argues, to the pre-eminent law that criminalizes homosexuality. The book tracks s. 
377 through several moments – statistical agencies, the police, judicial precedent, and 
contemporary court practice – to tease out various manifestations of the sexual state. 
In providing an ethnography of government institutions and through a close textual 
reading of precedent, of the petitions and judgments that first decriminalized 
homosexuality and then recriminalized it, the book attempts to move an account of 
the sexual state away from the criminalization of homosexuality in particular to the 
management of sexuality, more generally. As a lawyer for one of the parties in the 
case before the High Court1 and then in the Supreme Court2, and as scholar who also 
                                                                                                 
1 Naz Foundation v. Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi & Others 160 DLT 277. 
2 Suresh Kumar Koushal & Another v. Naz Foundation & Others (2014) 1 SCC 1. 
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engages in anthropological approaches to state and the law, I read this book with a 
great deal of interest, but ended on a note of some hesitancy – for reasons I note at the 
end of this review.  
The book is divided into three parts that map out its conceptual concerns. The 
introductory part is concerned with mapping sexuality’s effects on mundane 
bureaucratic practices. Sexuality, she argues, is at the heart of the enumerative 
functions of the biopolitical state. Puri tracks her forays into the National Crime 
Records Bureau and her efforts to obtain statistics about crimes recorded under s. 377 
only to be told that these statistics were not worth the effort to generate, and that she 
would be better off studying crimes (including sexual assault) against women, for 
which statistics did exist. Puri understands this statistical silence with regard to crimes 
under s. 377 not as form of heternormative reticence around homosexuality, but rather 
that crimes against women had been elevated as a social problem, which is not the 
case regarding homosexual sexual activity. The framing of sexual violence against 
women as an egregious social issue because of its frequency and its seriousness, 
meant that the biopolitical state sought to enumerate, evaluate and track the scale of 
the problem over time – hence the production of statistics. Puri argues this relative 
statistical silence as indicative of more subtle and diverse ways in which sexuality is 
policed, beyond s. 377. 
Part II, comprising of chapters 3 and 4, looks at s. 377 in two other registers of 
governance: first, through complaints filed under section 377 and through its 
legislative history and judicial expansion; and second, in the imagination of police 
officials amongst whom Puri conducted fieldwork. The effort in both these chapters is 
to decouple s. 377 from the construction of the figure of the homosexual, and to open 
out the analytical sphere of regulation of sexuality by the Indian state, beyond this one 
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provision. In chapter 3, Puri notes, as many others have (Gupta: 2006; Narrain: 2004), 
that while the legislative intent of the provision may have been linked to Victorian 
horror of homosexual acts, the limited number of recorded cases under s. 377 reveals 
that its sparing use has been primarily targeted towards criminalizing child sexual 
abuse. As she and those authors have pointed out, the vast majority of the cases are 
cases of child sexual abuse and she joins them in pointing out that the vague phrasing 
that the provision employs (“carnal intercourse against the order of nature”) has 
meant that a growing number of sexual acts come to be brought under its ambit by 
judicial interpretation. Her point of departure however, is the way she reads the 
modest corpus of cases. Puri argues that some have taken an unnecessary Foucauldian 
turn in arguing that the corpus of case law under s. 377 is productive of the figure of 
the criminalized homosexual. She argues that one ought to read the precedent as 
primarily about child sexual abuse and not homosexuality and that the “archive does 
not evidence a clear-cut socio-legal history of persecution against homosexuals in 
India.” (p. 71). She makes a strategic point here – that instead of reading the judicial 
history of the section as one targeting homosexuals, but as one that inadequately 
targets child sexual abuse, then the existence of the provision is hard to justify (p. 70) 
and is a way of demonstrating the law’s irrationalities (p. 71). 
Chapter 4 is based on fieldwork conducted at HIV/AIDS informational and 
sensitization programs conducted at police stations in Delhi. (p. 80) She argues that 
although gay men, men who have sex with men, and lesbians are not immune from 
invasive policing of their sex lives, that s. 377 is most likely to imperil communities 
that are seen as hypersexualized – Muslims and Hijras. Puri argues that the constables 
she interacted with at these programs, argued that crimes under s. 377 – ranging from 
child sexual abuse, to sex with animals – were more likely to be committed by 
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Muslims or Hijra’s. Puri persuasively argues that we should not see this as a form a 
prejudice based on community, but rather on the idea of race. Racial characteristics, 
as opposed to religious or communal characteristics, are seen as phenotypically 
coded, inherent and passed down from one generation to the next. According to her, 
this reflects is the “queering of racialized religious minorities and the insistence on 
their association with criminality.” (p. 90). This idea of criminal sexuality as inhering 
in a racial type is reflected in the criminalization of Hijras under the colonial-era 
Criminal Tribes Act - which was premised on the idea that certain groups of people 
were biologically predisposed to committing certain types of crime. Puri’s 
ethnography also reveals that several other statutes – such as anti-trafficking, and 
public decency laws – were used by the police to regulate Hijras. 
Part III is concerned is concerned with the court case filed by an NGO, the Naz 
Foundation, about the constitutionality of s. 377. Here, the book tracks the initial 
petition before the High Court, the subsequent High Court and Supreme Court 
judgments, the government responses and the reaction from sections of the queer 
movement in India.  
Chapter 5 looks at the period of the case from when it was initially filed in 2001 
to the period of when it was first dismissed by the High Court on a technicality in 
2006. Puri notes that there were several criticisms of the initial petition – the fact that 
there was little community involvement in the decision to go to court; the framing of 
the initial petition around an HIV/AIDS argument rather than a fundamental-rights 
one; that the petition should not have been thought as an end in itself, but rather as a 
campaign tool. While the book does not delve deeper into what these criticisms and 
anxieties might tell us about the investments in the state and law, it does point out the 
efforts that Naz foundation undertook to make the process more open and democratic. 
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In analyzing the government’s reply opposing the petition, the chapter is particularly 
insightful as it argues that sexuality here emerges, not only as a locus through which 
regimes of discipline come to operate, but also as providing a raison d’etre for the 
state. The inflammatory language used that highlighted the perils of unbridled 
sexuality, affirmed the state as a crucial source of governance (p. 117). The state 
comes to represent itself as “protecting the natural and social order.”  
Building on attempts to de-centre s. 377 in its previous chapters, the book also 
criticizes the petition for reinforcing the view that s. 377 “was the primary instrument 
of the state’s symbolic and material persecution of the homosexual.” (p. 124.) Puri 
argues that not only did the petition foreclose the possibility of reading s. 377 as an 
inadequate child sexual abuse law rather than an anti-homosexual statute, but it also 
ignored the myriad of other laws and practices that were used to police sexuality. 
Chapter 6 then moves into a close comparative reading of the High Court’s 
judgment in 2009 decriminalizing consensual sexual acts and the Supreme Court’s 
2013 pronouncement overturning this ruling. The book argues that though the 
judgments come to wholly divergent conclusions, both are responses to the neo-
liberal moment that India finds itself in. Puri argues that the High Court’s judgment 
represents an attempt to limit the field of the state and does so by deploying a neo-
liberal rights regime premised on the primacy of the individual and a territorialized 
right to privacy. The Supreme Court’s ruling reaffirms the role of the state in 
regulating sexuality in the context of a state imperiled by neo-liberalism. 
The book productively offers the idea of sexuality as an important additive to 
our idea of biopolitics, and shows the ways in which sexuality is constitutive of state 
power. Further, the book makes an important contribution to theories of community in 
the Indian context, by first racialising it, and then queering it. While it does not situate 
This	  is	  the	  accepted	  version	  of	  an	  article	  published	  in	  Feminist	  Legal	  Studies	  by	  Springer	  Verlag	  online	  26	  August	  
2016	  available	  at:	  http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10691-­‐016-­‐9327-­‐7	  	  
Accepted	  version	  downloaded	  from	  SOAS	  Research	  Online:	  http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/22867/	  	  
	  
judicial wrangling over s. 377 amidst critical scholarship of the Indian judiciary’s 
public interest jurisprudence, the book is an important contribution to this field as 
well. To my mind, however, the book misses out on several key moments during the 
court hearings (A pivotal moment was when the Ministry of Health opposed the 
government’s stand and supported the petition in the High Court). More importantly, 
it lacks, in my opinion, in three methodological and theoretical aspects.  
Firstly, chapter 3 argues that the judicial precedent under s. 377 does not lend 
itself to the narrative of the criminalized homosexual and that this archive ought to 
read as one pertaining to child sexual abuse. This points to the fact that while book 
looks through law to examine the nature of the state, it fails to look at the techniques 
of drawing connections and analogy that the law itself employs (Riles: 2005). Merely 
because the vast corpus of the cases factually pertains to child sexual abuse, does not 
mean that it was inaccurate to draw out the image of the criminalised homosexual. At 
a certain level of abstraction, it becomes difficult to discern whether a statement, like 
“the natural object of sexual intercourse is that there should be the possibility of 
conception of human beings,”3 applies to homosexuality or child sexual abuse – 
simply because the process of legal analogy asks that it apply to both (Latour: 
2002/2009; Riles: 2005). Further, the book’s thin understanding of legal techniques 
means that it cannot understand the petition beyond its immediate object of 
decriminalizing homosexuality. Had the High Court judgment stood, could it not have 
been cited to undermine these other laws that Puri rightly argues also regulate 
sexuality? It was cited in the case of Dr. Siras – one that the book mentions – 
regarding the suspension of a male University professor for having sex with another 
man. In that case, the court specifically relied upon the right to privacy to temporarily 
                                                                                                 
3 Khanu v. Emperor AIR 1925 Sind 286. 
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stay the suspension4 – an outcome that would have been doubtful, had it not been for 
the Naz Foundation case. 
 Secondly, while the petition is faulted for focusing on s. 377 alone, this is also 
the book’s primary drawback. It repeats the well-taken point that there are other laws 
that impact upon sexuality – laws from anti-trafficking statutes, to vagrancy 
ordinances to public decency laws. But the book’s focus on s. 377, has occluded from 
its vision that the same lawyers, organisations and activists involved in efforts to 
decriminalize homosexuality, are also involved in issues pertaining to these other 
laws. While the book rightly points out that s. 377 was the petition’s main point of 
attack, it does not situate the petition within its wider milieu of sexuality rights 
activism more generally. The movement against s. 377 arises from everyday visceral 
interactions with police around trafficking, sex work and vagrancy laws. Had the 
book provided a more rounded view of the struggles around sexuality in India through 
its text, and not just at the introductory and concluding chapters, we might have seen a 
more thorough understanding of the sexual state.  
Third, while the sexual state is an enticing idea, the book frames the idea of the 
state through a paradox: it is “the primary site of injustice and then as the arbiter of 
justice” (p. 22). While the book productively argues that the state is produced through 
the everyday and emerges as a fragmented and messy entity (p. 10), it is unclear why 
approaching the state is seen as a paradox. Since it understands the state only as a sign 
of an ever-present threat, the book offers no way to understand why the petition was 
filed in the first place. Several anthropologies of the Indian state have argued that the 
state can manifest a number of potentials – from care, to compassion, to violence, to 
                                                                                                 
4  Order  dated  01.04.2010  in  Writ  Petition  (Civil)  No.  17549  of  2010,  before  the  High  Court  of  
Allahabad  titled  Dr.  Shrinivas  Ramchandra  Siras  &  Others  v.  The  Aligarh  Muslim  University  &  
Others.    
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neglect (Singh: 2015; Gupta: 2012; Das: 2007; see also Fassin: 2005). Following this, 
if a state can be, as the book argues, contingent and inconsistent, why is it a 
contradiction to see the state as “the site of injustice toward same-sex sexualities and 
also the wellspring of justice”? (p. 71) (emphasis mine) Chapter 6 reads the High 
Court’s decision as diminishing the power of the state (p. 139), while the Supreme 
Court’s judgment is seen as re-entrenching the expanse of the state. Could this not be 
equally read as a caring state (in the High Court) and a violent one (the Supreme 
Court)? Undoubtedly engaging with the state is a risky business, but had the book 
understood the state more than just the inevitable site of danger, it could have seen 
other affects and desires that emerged through the sexual state. 
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